Controversial text

I have been away for a long time, but I think it's time to return. I recently posted a text on one of our forums, the copy of a letter I have sebt to several European authorities. Some of my colleagues have opposed because they think some parts may be taken out of context. Here goes the letter, so as to clarify what the context, given the case, was. I'll write ore shortly
Dear Sir/ Madam
May I begin by confessing a secret? Many air traffic controllers in Spain are hoping for an accident to happen. The trampling over our working terms and conditions has been so painful and the passivity of supervisory institutions (not to mention the lack of independence between providers and supervisors) has been such, that we believe that only the investigation of an accident by different international bodies will unravel the mess and "normalise" our situation. To talk about a death toll of 500 passengers would be scaremongering, but to ignore what has recently happened would be plainly foolish. And I think we have already been foolish enough!
In any case, it is not my intention to write about conditions, I would just prefer to outline the shortcomings of an air traffic control service provider, even if there is much more to be said about the former.
I was initially going to write what I hoped would be an enlightening report about the events of the 26th of July, when three (Ryanair) aircraft landed in an emergency, a further one from Air Nostrum crossed clouds depicted in red on its weather radar screen and quite a few other, perhaps minor, incidents happened. But after some consideration, I believe all the following is part of the same global situation, upon which I have occasionally written before to several addressees.
Unfortunately I seldom receive a response, and this makes me wonder if there is anyone really interested in Safety, or are all parties just relying on the number of filters embedded in the system being enough to ensure that everything turns out fine. (This, of course, would possibly be true if everyone complied with their obligations) Eventually, there will be a true accident and someone will have to be held accountable. Of course, the first attempt will be to place the blame on the dead victims, as is often the case, but this cannot be endlessly swallowed, and the blame will have to be placed elsewhere. Do you think that undertrained, under-assessed and overworked air traffic controllers will be responsible? Of course they may (try to) be held responsible, but that will be unfair. Is your job just another cog in the wheels of relentless efficiency following the rules of unbridled capitalism and money making? Or are you in some way related to the improvement of Safety in the system?
It’s difficult to explain air traffic control to the layman, and I have addressed diverse policy-makers apart from controllers, but I’ll try. I attended a course on the 7th August last at my workplace (Aena, Madrid). The main object was a new layout of the Madrid Terminal Area, where there have been variations on many different aspects. All were presented as projects where, contrary to the presentation, no consultation to the air traffic controllers who work there every day has been effected (thank you!), but I digress… Some procedure flight levels change, some VFR flight routes are added, there have also been changes in airspace classification and procedure names. They are not projects at all and will be imposed on Sept 20th.
My personal opinion, that I voiced in the classroom, is that the course should have taken three or four mornings instead of one. There was not enough time to take on board all the information provided. I also believe that where procedures are included there should be additional training in a simulator. None of this has happened. Be it the current economic crisis or just pressure from the actors to improve profit-making efficiency, there is lately a worrying tendency to reduce instruction/training times and to implement anything without the prior preparation.
After the course a test is taken. The instructors are aware of the contents of the test (I suggest this should not be so). They explain their own mnemonics during the lessons in order to permit controllers (my opinion) not to learn the basics, but rather just to pass the test. But more significantly, as time was running short, no discussion was allowed, and many of the powerpoint presentation screenshots were just skipped over. Furthermore, I am aware of having failed some of the test questions. I should therefore have to retake the test or the course, or even have my license withdrawn, but no-one has yet even acknowledged my result. How many examples are needed to prove that Aena just follows a cost cutting schedule, regardless of its effect on excellence.
Allow me to take a few moments to compare Spanish Air traffic Control (and its controllers) with that of other similar countries. As far as I can gather (the info is on public websites) initial training with the main providers outside Spain is a process which takes around three years and carries a failure rate of between 35% and 60%. Within Spain the course takes around a year less (in spite of usually needing additional training in English) and the failure rate is around 5%!. I have sometimes enquired why, and the response has been that Spanish ATC students have been more carefully selected. This is tantamount to saying that the English or the Americans are stupid for wasting their resources on underqualified students. The underlying truth must be that in Spain some people not valid for the job are in it. (Admittedly, some others may have acquired the tools eventually, albeit in a much longer time period than reasonable).
This is a deplorable state of events that will lead to a very low level of operational competency in the Spanish skies. Our safety record is already far from being amongst the best. This text is just an attempt at gaining some insight into the workings of a progressively failing system, with the idea of fixing it. I apologise for not having the latest numbers, but in 2009 Spain declared 47 airproxes (potential collisions) whilst there were none in, for example, the British airspace serviced by NATS.
As you have learned, three Ryanair aircraft landed in Valencia on the evening of July 26th after declaring emergency on the air traffic control frequency. They were running extremely short on fuel, after being stuck –for a variable period of time- in some sort of a holding pattern prior to trying to land at Madrid. I happened to be one of the two Supervisors on watch in the Madrid Terminal Area at the time. We did our best to get those aircraft on the ground in time, but the weather was (not unprecedented but) terrible.
When thunderstorms appear improvisation is inevitable, but it should always be kept to a minimum. In Spain (call it the idiosyncracy of the latin character if you will) it is becoming the norm. Just a few data: of the dozens of aircraft that were circling around Madrid airport, most had Valencia as their alternative landing field. But the Valencia capacity, it shortly transpired, was for four (4) aircraft. Of course, more could have landed in an emergency and occupied taxiways, but this is exactly what happened prior to the 1977 accident in Tenerife, surely it’s best to avoid any coincidence. So a couple dozen aircraft were calculating their remaining fuel based upon an inexistent possibility; they would need to fly to other, farther, airports. (The possibility of near-by Zaragoza and Salamanca, both military, had already been explored)
Had this eventuality been reported previously? I have done it myself, both verbally and in writing. Have the Madrid ATCOs (Air Traffic Controllers) been trained to advise traffic of the additional –life threatening- difficulty? No.
Furthermore, the clouds on July 26th, as you might already presume, were dense and wide stretching. The additional flying time to avoid them was at least ten minutes. Were the flight crews informed? The answer depends on the level of experience and momentaneous inspiration of the ATCO involved. This happens, but the impending question is Has Aena trained controllers and done the necessary drills in order to foresee and better act in these situations? Once again, the answer is No.
I feel it necessary to inform you of the latest setback and preceding events. Spain is in economic turmoil and Aena isn’t exactly the most affluent company in the business. Cost cutting has its effects. Around two years ago, Aena decreed that the minimum training time (hours of On Job Training) was from thereon to be considered maximum training time. The Head of training then objected and refused to sign his part; he was immediately removed and degraded, subsequently falling into depression.
And the very latest scandal, Aena is currently in the process of revalidating ATCOs from the recently privatised towers in order to work in the Centres. Their new job is arguably more difficult. In any case, the retraining of ATCOs who have been working for decades in a tower is a difficult aim and some failures are bound o occur. The latest Aena decree has been that, instead of passing three exams out of three, which was the norm, it now suffices to pass just two. In other words, if you prove being unable to do the job once out of three times, you can still get validated. I don't know of any broken rule, but this is contrary to common sense. Quality is being constantly degraded, and someone should do something about it.
Three emergencies, three disasters. These were due to human factors combined with spending cuts. It is beyond me to know whether these Ryanairs were running with the required fuel or not, but I do know that they would have taken a better informed decision had controllers been better trained, rostered and rested (Spanish controllers continue to be amongst the most prolific in Europe). It comes as a great fortune that at least they were all very experienced: Aena has trained no new controllers for about seven years; this will in turn pose its problems in the future. I believe it is our/your duty to consider emergencies as actual accidents insofar as improvement can be gained from them. "Just Culture" is just a vague, empty expression in Spain, as it coexists with other rulings such as the Ley de Seguridad Aérea (Air Safety Bill) which is just a handcuffing rule decreed to keep air traffic controllers quiet whilst the impending privatisation is carried out, it is worth less than the paper it is printed on. Just for tasters (amongst many other absurd rulings), the fine for faking illness unjustifiably is 4.500.000 euros ( yes, four and a half million!). The obvious consequence is that people are working through any illness or fatigue.
Let me turn to English proficiency. As you know, communication in air traffic control is in English (or local tongue for local pilots and controllers). Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs), such as Aena, assess prospective controllers before hiring them. As regular workplace language usage is based upon little more than increasing or decreasing speeds, heights, headings or reading out procedure names, it seems evident that ANSPs where English is not the mother tongue should have in place programmes for refreshing the English of their workers, as indeed some English mother tongue providers have workshops for the proper usage of aeronautical phraseology. Aena, once again, fails and has not had such a programme available since I joined, fifteen years ago. When ICAO required controllers to prove their language proficiency via the approved exams, Aena suddenly made an online plan available, just to abide by the ICAO rules. It was to be carried out in spare time and you would be made redundant if you didn't pass...
My view is that any exam system smells if everyone passes at first shot, and a company fails if it doesn't provide the basic training before assessment. This is the case of Aena. But Spain goes much further than that: the Development Minister José Blanco decreed (by law) that Spanish controllers were "operational" level 4 out of 6 just for not having had incidents, completely forgetting that the whole ICAO requirement was based upon incidents in "non standard" situations, which may crop up very rarely.
This decreed level eventually expired, but the system still stinks, for the simple reason that the Spanish regulator (AESA) is now accepting exams that were enacted over a telephone, with no ID provided by the examinees!. This is contrary to requirements. These "validations" expire some time in 2013. Even though excellence is beyond the realms of utopia, why doesn't Aena strive for excellence and introduce a language programme with the aim of improving the English level of all controllers (including myself)? The compulsory training in English was somehow "ommitted" when the relevant ICAO ruling was translated for Spain. Why?
Let me finish talking about the, also compulsory, briefing. Additional to Eurocontrol, common sense dictates that certain operational info needs to be known by ATCOs before they start their watch. Aena does nothing of the sort, but they will probably have stated that the briefing requirement has been satisfied because the information is made available via a sheet of paper handed out to controllers on each watch.
The controllers will oppose: the paper is sometimes received, seldom read, hardly ever properly understood (it uses somewhat cryptic language and there are no experts standing by to clarify). No time is assigned for reading said document (so it has to be done whilst separating aircraft), no provision is made for supervisors to actually hand out the self-called "briefing". No acknowledgement is required, so there is no accountability. I believe that no further comment is needed from my part.
I sincerely thank you very much for reading thus far. Would you now please take some time to imagine how the validation of new controllers in the recently privatized control towers is going. Previous controllers have been obliged to act as instructors, even if they have only been validated themselves for few weeks! Plus all the above.
Keep your fingers crossed, even if you probably could do more!


Simon A.Rance.
Air Traffic Controller. Supervisor. Madrid Terminal Area.