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Sunday, 16 September 2012

Controversial text

I have been away for a long time, but I think it's time to return. I recently posted a text on one of our forums, the copy of a letter I have sebt to several European authorities. Some of my colleagues have opposed because they think some parts may be taken out of context. Here goes the letter, so as to clarify what the context, given the case, was. I'll write ore shortly
Dear Sir/ Madam
May I begin by confessing a secret? Many air traffic controllers in Spain are hoping for an accident to happen. The trampling over our working terms and conditions has been so painful and the passivity of supervisory institutions (not to mention the lack of independence between providers and supervisors) has been such, that we believe that only the investigation of an accident by different international bodies will unravel the mess and "normalise" our situation. To talk about a death toll of 500 passengers would be scaremongering, but to ignore what has recently happened would be plainly foolish. And I think we have already been foolish enough!
In any case, it is not my intention to write about conditions, I would just prefer to outline the shortcomings of an air traffic control service provider, even if there is much more to be said about the former.
I was initially going to write what I hoped would be an enlightening report about the events of the 26th of July, when three (Ryanair) aircraft landed in an emergency, a further one from Air Nostrum crossed clouds depicted in red on its weather radar screen and quite a few other, perhaps minor, incidents happened. But after some consideration, I believe all the following is part of the same global situation, upon which I have occasionally written before to several addressees.
Unfortunately I seldom receive a response, and this makes me wonder if there is anyone really interested in Safety, or are all parties just relying on the number of filters embedded in the system being enough to ensure that everything turns out fine. (This, of course, would possibly be true if everyone complied with their obligations) Eventually, there will be a true accident and someone will have to be held accountable. Of course, the first attempt will be to place the blame on the dead victims, as is often the case, but this cannot be endlessly swallowed, and the blame will have to be placed elsewhere. Do you think that undertrained, under-assessed and overworked air traffic controllers will be responsible? Of course they may (try to) be held responsible, but that will be unfair. Is your job just another cog in the wheels of relentless efficiency following the rules of unbridled capitalism and money making? Or are you in some way related to the improvement of Safety in the system?
It’s difficult to explain air traffic control to the layman, and I have addressed diverse policy-makers apart from controllers, but I’ll try. I attended a course on the 7th August last at my workplace (Aena, Madrid). The main object was a new layout of the Madrid Terminal Area, where there have been variations on many different aspects. All were presented as projects where, contrary to the presentation, no consultation to the air traffic controllers who work there every day has been effected (thank you!), but I digress… Some procedure flight levels change, some VFR flight routes are added, there have also been changes in airspace classification and procedure names. They are not projects at all and will be imposed on Sept 20th.
My personal opinion, that I voiced in the classroom, is that the course should have taken three or four mornings instead of one. There was not enough time to take on board all the information provided. I also believe that where procedures are included there should be additional training in a simulator. None of this has happened. Be it the current economic crisis or just pressure from the actors to improve profit-making efficiency, there is lately a worrying tendency to reduce instruction/training times and to implement anything without the prior preparation.
After the course a test is taken. The instructors are aware of the contents of the test (I suggest this should not be so). They explain their own mnemonics during the lessons in order to permit controllers (my opinion) not to learn the basics, but rather just to pass the test. But more significantly, as time was running short, no discussion was allowed, and many of the powerpoint presentation screenshots were just skipped over. Furthermore, I am aware of having failed some of the test questions. I should therefore have to retake the test or the course, or even have my license withdrawn, but no-one has yet even acknowledged my result. How many examples are needed to prove that Aena just follows a cost cutting schedule, regardless of its effect on excellence.
Allow me to take a few moments to compare Spanish Air traffic Control (and its controllers) with that of other similar countries. As far as I can gather (the info is on public websites) initial training with the main providers outside Spain is a process which takes around three years and carries a failure rate of between 35% and 60%. Within Spain the course takes around a year less (in spite of usually needing additional training in English) and the failure rate is around 5%!. I have sometimes enquired why, and the response has been that Spanish ATC students have been more carefully selected. This is tantamount to saying that the English or the Americans are stupid for wasting their resources on underqualified students. The underlying truth must be that in Spain some people not valid for the job are in it. (Admittedly, some others may have acquired the tools eventually, albeit in a much longer time period than reasonable).
This is a deplorable state of events that will lead to a very low level of operational competency in the Spanish skies. Our safety record is already far from being amongst the best. This text is just an attempt at gaining some insight into the workings of a progressively failing system, with the idea of fixing it. I apologise for not having the latest numbers, but in 2009 Spain declared 47 airproxes (potential collisions) whilst there were none in, for example, the British airspace serviced by NATS.
As you have learned, three Ryanair aircraft landed in Valencia on the evening of July 26th after declaring emergency on the air traffic control frequency. They were running extremely short on fuel, after being stuck –for a variable period of time- in some sort of a holding pattern prior to trying to land at Madrid. I happened to be one of the two Supervisors on watch in the Madrid Terminal Area at the time. We did our best to get those aircraft on the ground in time, but the weather was (not unprecedented but) terrible.
When thunderstorms appear improvisation is inevitable, but it should always be kept to a minimum. In Spain (call it the idiosyncracy of the latin character if you will) it is becoming the norm. Just a few data: of the dozens of aircraft that were circling around Madrid airport, most had Valencia as their alternative landing field. But the Valencia capacity, it shortly transpired, was for four (4) aircraft. Of course, more could have landed in an emergency and occupied taxiways, but this is exactly what happened prior to the 1977 accident in Tenerife, surely it’s best to avoid any coincidence. So a couple dozen aircraft were calculating their remaining fuel based upon an inexistent possibility; they would need to fly to other, farther, airports. (The possibility of near-by Zaragoza and Salamanca, both military, had already been explored)
Had this eventuality been reported previously? I have done it myself, both verbally and in writing. Have the Madrid ATCOs (Air Traffic Controllers) been trained to advise traffic of the additional –life threatening- difficulty? No.
Furthermore, the clouds on July 26th, as you might already presume, were dense and wide stretching. The additional flying time to avoid them was at least ten minutes. Were the flight crews informed? The answer depends on the level of experience and momentaneous inspiration of the ATCO involved. This happens, but the impending question is Has Aena trained controllers and done the necessary drills in order to foresee and better act in these situations? Once again, the answer is No.
I feel it necessary to inform you of the latest setback and preceding events. Spain is in economic turmoil and Aena isn’t exactly the most affluent company in the business. Cost cutting has its effects. Around two years ago, Aena decreed that the minimum training time (hours of On Job Training) was from thereon to be considered maximum training time. The Head of training then objected and refused to sign his part; he was immediately removed and degraded, subsequently falling into depression.
And the very latest scandal, Aena is currently in the process of revalidating ATCOs from the recently privatised towers in order to work in the Centres. Their new job is arguably more difficult. In any case, the retraining of ATCOs who have been working for decades in a tower is a difficult aim and some failures are bound o occur. The latest Aena decree has been that, instead of passing three exams out of three, which was the norm, it now suffices to pass just two. In other words, if you prove being unable to do the job once out of three times, you can still get validated. I don't know of any broken rule, but this is contrary to common sense. Quality is being constantly degraded, and someone should do something about it.
Three emergencies, three disasters. These were due to human factors combined with spending cuts. It is beyond me to know whether these Ryanairs were running with the required fuel or not, but I do know that they would have taken a better informed decision had controllers been better trained, rostered and rested (Spanish controllers continue to be amongst the most prolific in Europe). It comes as a great fortune that at least they were all very experienced: Aena has trained no new controllers for about seven years; this will in turn pose its problems in the future. I believe it is our/your duty to consider emergencies as actual accidents insofar as improvement can be gained from them. "Just Culture" is just a vague, empty expression in Spain, as it coexists with other rulings such as the Ley de Seguridad Aérea (Air Safety Bill) which is just a handcuffing rule decreed to keep air traffic controllers quiet whilst the impending privatisation is carried out, it is worth less than the paper it is printed on. Just for tasters (amongst many other absurd rulings), the fine for faking illness unjustifiably is 4.500.000 euros ( yes, four and a half million!). The obvious consequence is that people are working through any illness or fatigue.
Let me turn to English proficiency. As you know, communication in air traffic control is in English (or local tongue for local pilots and controllers). Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs), such as Aena, assess prospective controllers before hiring them. As regular workplace language usage is based upon little more than increasing or decreasing speeds, heights, headings or reading out procedure names, it seems evident that ANSPs where English is not the mother tongue should have in place programmes for refreshing the English of their workers, as indeed some English mother tongue providers have workshops for the proper usage of aeronautical phraseology. Aena, once again, fails and has not had such a programme available since I joined, fifteen years ago. When ICAO required controllers to prove their language proficiency via the approved exams, Aena suddenly made an online plan available, just to abide by the ICAO rules. It was to be carried out in spare time and you would be made redundant if you didn't pass...
My view is that any exam system smells if everyone passes at first shot, and a company fails if it doesn't provide the basic training before assessment. This is the case of Aena. But Spain goes much further than that: the Development Minister José Blanco decreed (by law) that Spanish controllers were "operational" level 4 out of 6 just for not having had incidents, completely forgetting that the whole ICAO requirement was based upon incidents in "non standard" situations, which may crop up very rarely.
This decreed level eventually expired, but the system still stinks, for the simple reason that the Spanish regulator (AESA) is now accepting exams that were enacted over a telephone, with no ID provided by the examinees!. This is contrary to requirements. These "validations" expire some time in 2013. Even though excellence is beyond the realms of utopia, why doesn't Aena strive for excellence and introduce a language programme with the aim of improving the English level of all controllers (including myself)? The compulsory training in English was somehow "ommitted" when the relevant ICAO ruling was translated for Spain. Why?
Let me finish talking about the, also compulsory, briefing. Additional to Eurocontrol, common sense dictates that certain operational info needs to be known by ATCOs before they start their watch. Aena does nothing of the sort, but they will probably have stated that the briefing requirement has been satisfied because the information is made available via a sheet of paper handed out to controllers on each watch.
The controllers will oppose: the paper is sometimes received, seldom read, hardly ever properly understood (it uses somewhat cryptic language and there are no experts standing by to clarify). No time is assigned for reading said document (so it has to be done whilst separating aircraft), no provision is made for supervisors to actually hand out the self-called "briefing". No acknowledgement is required, so there is no accountability. I believe that no further comment is needed from my part.
I sincerely thank you very much for reading thus far. Would you now please take some time to imagine how the validation of new controllers in the recently privatized control towers is going. Previous controllers have been obliged to act as instructors, even if they have only been validated themselves for few weeks! Plus all the above.
Keep your fingers crossed, even if you probably could do more!


Simon A.Rance.
Air Traffic Controller. Supervisor. Madrid Terminal Area.

Sunday, 14 August 2011

Moral decay and greedy politicians

I just read an article so good that I have to share it with you, It speaks about the moral decay at the top of society in comparison with the events that affected London and other cities in the UK last week.
I can't hel believing that in Spain things may not be so obvious, but that is merely because the Press is much more closely controlled and because the Judiciary isn't an independent power. Here, politicians privatize huge companies and help thenselves to hefty commisions. How can you understand that the Barajas Airport improvement budget was initially 1.750 million euros and ended at 6.200. Just an example of a corrupt system. Here goes my promised article:

The moral decay of our society is as bad at the top as the bottom

Tottenham ablaze: the riots began early on Sunday (Photo: AP)
Tottenham ablaze: the riots began early on Sunday (Photo: AP)
David Cameron, Ed Miliband and the entire British political class came together yesterday to denounce the rioters. They were of course right to say that the actions of these looters, arsonists and muggers were abhorrent and criminal, and that the police should be given more support.
But there was also something very phony and hypocritical about all the shock and outrage expressed in parliament. MPs spoke about the week’s dreadful events as if they were nothing to do with them.
I cannot accept that this is the case. Indeed, I believe that the criminality in our streets cannot be dissociated from the moral disintegration in the highest ranks of modern British society. The last two decades have seen a terrifying decline in standards among the British governing elite. It has become acceptable for our politicians to lie and to cheat. An almost universal culture of selfishness and greed has grown up.
It is not just the feral youth of Tottenham who have forgotten they have duties as well as rights. So have the feral rich of Chelsea and Kensington. A few years ago, my wife and I went to a dinner party in a large house in west London. A security guard prowled along the street outside, and there was much talk of the “north-south divide”, which I took literally for a while until I realised that my hosts were facetiously referring to the difference between those who lived north and south of Kensington High Street.
Most of the people in this very expensive street were every bit as deracinated and cut off from the rest of Britain as the young, unemployed men and women who have caused such terrible damage over the last few days. For them, the repellent Financial Times magazine How to Spend It is a bible. I’d guess that few of them bother to pay British tax if they can avoid it, and that fewer still feel the sense of obligation to society that only a few decades ago came naturally to the wealthy and better off.
Yet we celebrate people who live empty lives like this. A few weeks ago, I noticed an item in a newspaper saying that the business tycoon Sir Richard Branson was thinking of moving his headquarters to Switzerland. This move was represented as a potential blow to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, because it meant less tax revenue.
I couldn’t help thinking that in a sane and decent world such a move would be a blow to Sir Richard, not the Chancellor. People would note that a prominent and wealthy businessman was avoiding British tax and think less of him. Instead, he has a knighthood and is widely feted. The same is true of the brilliant retailer Sir Philip Green. Sir Philip’s businesses could never survive but for Britain’s famous social and political stability, our transport system to shift his goods and our schools to educate his workers.
Yet Sir Philip, who a few years ago sent an extraordinary £1 billion dividend offshore, seems to have little intention of paying for much of this. Why does nobody get angry or hold him culpable? I know that he employs expensive tax lawyers and that everything he does is legal, but he surely faces ethical and moral questions just as much as does a young thug who breaks into one of Sir Philip’s shops and steals from it?
Our politicians – standing sanctimoniously on their hind legs in the Commons yesterday – are just as bad. They have shown themselves prepared to ignore common decency and, in some cases, to break the law. David Cameron is happy to have some of the worst offenders in his Cabinet. Take the example of Francis Maude, who is charged with tackling public sector waste – which trade unions say is a euphemism for waging war on low‑paid workers. Yet Mr Maude made tens of thousands of pounds by breaching the spirit, though not the law, surrounding MPs’ allowances.
A great deal has been made over the past few days of the greed of the rioters for consumer goods, not least by Rotherham MP Denis MacShane who accurately remarked, “What the looters wanted was for a few minutes to enter the world of Sloane Street consumption.” This from a man who notoriously claimed £5,900 for eight laptops. Of course, as an MP he obtained these laptops legally through his expenses.
Yesterday, the veteran Labour MP Gerald Kaufman asked the Prime Minister to consider how these rioters can be “reclaimed” by society. Yes, this is indeed the same Gerald Kaufman who submitted a claim for three months’ expenses totalling £14,301.60, which included £8,865 for a Bang & Olufsen television.
Or take the Salford MP Hazel Blears, who has been loudly calling for draconian action against the looters. I find it very hard to make any kind of ethical distinction between Blears’s expense cheating and tax avoidance, and the straight robbery carried out by the looters.
The Prime Minister showed no sign that he understood that something stank about yesterday’s Commons debate. He spoke of morality, but only as something which applies to the very poor: “We will restore a stronger sense of morality and responsibility – in every town, in every street and in every estate.” He appeared not to grasp that this should apply to the rich and powerful as well.
The tragic truth is that Mr Cameron is himself guilty of failing this test. It is scarcely six weeks since he jauntily turned up at the News International summer party, even though the media group was at the time subject to not one but two police investigations. Even more notoriously, he awarded a senior Downing Street job to the former News of the World editor Andy Coulson, even though he knew at the time that Coulson had resigned after criminal acts were committed under his editorship. The Prime Minister excused his wretched judgment by proclaiming that “everybody deserves a second chance”. It was very telling yesterday that he did not talk of second chances as he pledged exemplary punishment for the rioters and looters.
These double standards from Downing Street are symptomatic of widespread double standards at the very top of our society. It should be stressed that most people (including, I know, Telegraph readers) continue to believe in honesty, decency, hard work, and putting back into society at least as much as they take out.
But there are those who do not. Certainly, the so-called feral youth seem oblivious to decency and morality. But so are the venal rich and powerful – too many of our bankers, footballers, wealthy businessmen and politicians.
Of course, most of them are smart and wealthy enough to make sure that they obey the law. That cannot be said of the sad young men and women, without hope or aspiration, who have caused such mayhem and chaos over the past few days. But the rioters have this defence: they are just following the example set by senior and respected figures in society. Let’s bear in mind that many of the youths in our inner cities have never been trained in decent values. All they have ever known is barbarism. Our politicians and bankers, in sharp contrast, tend to have been to good schools and universities and to have been given every opportunity in life.
Something has gone horribly wrong in Britain. If we are ever to confront the problems which have been exposed in the past week, it is essential to bear in mind that they do not only exist in inner-city housing estates.
The culture of greed and impunity we are witnessing on our TV screens stretches right up into corporate boardrooms and the Cabinet. It embraces the police and large parts of our media. It is not just its damaged youth, but Britain itself that needs a moral reformation.

Sunday, 7 August 2011

Historical insight: end of middle class

Sometimes you would like to go further in the understanding of certain issues, and it seems hard to dissect the forces or tensions between markets, social classes, balance sheets or trends. Fortunately Michael Moore has given me a huge hand by publishing this article, the day before yesterday. Everything else falls in naturally.

Saturday, 6 August 2011

Early retirement: the new picture.

My friend L. became an ATCO in 1974. Ever since she started she was promised that she would be allowed to retire from her shift activity after a certain number of  years. The latest agreement allowed her to retire -keeping her pay- at 52 after 30 years of shifts, or at 55 after 17 years. She could have done either, but she decided to stay: her working conditions and rest were such that her night-time recovery was OK, and she still enjoyed her job and could do it safely. 
Recently there has been a change in timetables (once again, imposed). Mornings start at 6.45 or 7.30 instead of 8. Evenings end at 10.30 or 11.30 instead of 10. Under the new conditions, she now wants to leave -her pay halved- as she is over 60.
L. has decided that she has had enough, and she should be able to retire. She deserves it and she has already done her share. Aena has said that 62 years of age is enough. But they have told L. that, considering she is still operational, she can't go. 
Mr Lema still hasn't admitted there is a severe shortage of ATCO's. Eurocontrol has. Even the Press has. But Mr Lema won't. Conditions are so bad in Spain that colleagues are fleeing to Germany, Switzerland, even Bahrein. Others are reducing their hours, according to legislation, to care for their children or their ageing parents. 
Aena has to keep as many ATCO's on board as possible. But the ship is still sinking. Spain is (i would add arguably, but I believe it's beyond argument) now the most understaffed, undertrained, under-rested and overworked airspace in Europe. It beholds more delays and near misses than anywhere else. I dare not say any more, lest I be accused of scaremongering…

Thursday, 4 August 2011

Phone hacking

I know this post is long overdue. Have you heard about the phone hacking scandal in UK? It's made a one hundred and sixty eight year old paper disappear, a police chief resign, quite a few Press bosses dump their careers, and it's even shaken the ground Prime Minister Cameron treads upon.
Phone hacking happened to Spanish air traffic controllers last year. My own phone used to receive calls from non existing numbers. The battery suddenly heated up unexpectedly (meaning the phone was being used as a remote microphone). All of this happened before phone tapping was finally authorised by a Judge.
The person responsible for this is now the PSOE candidate for the next General Election in Spain, due for 20th November.

Sunday, 26 June 2011

Forty seven near misses.

The Performance Review report for 2010 has just been published. It highlights one main point regarding safety, but first let me tell you, to my knowledge, how the reports are done. If you are really interested you can check the Eurocontrol PRR 2010, available on the internet. I am obviously only going to disclose the important data from my (admittedly biased) position.
That said, the data Eurocontrol publishes has previously been forwarded by the Air Navigation Service Providers, they usually follow Eurocontrol criteria for category classification, and they are also usually backed by the expertise of the national safety supervising authority (in Spain, AESA, Agencia Española de Seguridad Aérea). There are occasional discrepancies from the general rule, but basically the data is perfectly comparable.
Regarding the classification criteria, suffice it to say that, to avoid being too technical, they are class A (near collision), class B (Safety not guaranteed), and others. Either of the two former are very serious incidents. Of course, where humans operate the system, mistakes are prone to occur. So I’ll just give you the data for class A incidents for countries comparable to Spain and let you arrive at your own conclusions.
France ---14
Germany --- 4
UK (Nats) --- 0
SPAIN --- 47
I was going to leave it there, but Aena adds a line saying that none of the Spanish near collisions was due to ATM (Air Traffic Management). Yes, I also wondered at first whether pilots had just gone berserk and had decided to ram into each other. Obviously, our magnificent management staff had just decided that having Spanish controllers work half as much more than British or German controllers, or calling them for duty on their day off (compulsory attendance, remember), or cancelling their holidays once their plane tickets and hotels were booked, or leaving them for years on end without touching a simulator, or allowing one day’s rest out of each six; or endorsing their English level, not because they had had enough training but because they have never been entangled in a language related incident before, had nothing to do with their professional capacity.
Fortunately, we know the figures and we are doing our best to improve safety, but it isn’t easy. I’ll write about that soon.

Traffic Regulations

I am aware that most of my readers are aviation specialists, but some are not. Therefore I apologise for some layman explanations I sometimes prefer to make.
Air traffic control basically is no more than the surveillance of traffic flow to ensure that safety is always guaranteed along the flight path. National airspaces are covered by different companies (ANSPs), usually just one per country. Then they are divided into different regions (FIR, Flight Information Regions). Each one of these is usually managed from one workplace (Control Centre), which, in turn, is subdivided into different sectors, each one managed by one team of controllers, comprising from one to three ATCOs. Sometimes (in low traffic periods, such as night-times) these sectors are merged, forming a new sector, with a different name.
Each sector (or resulting sector) has a declared maximum overall capacity, which has theoretically been determined through workload studies, considering optimum conditions. When being licensed, controllers train in a simulator that reproduces the normal traffic flow. The trainees commence with a low traffic exercise and increase their skill by increasing traffic until the maximum capacity (or even further in simulators) and then contingencies are introduced). These could be anything from a radio failure to aircraft in an emergency, bad weather, ash clouds, malfunctioning equipment such as radar or radio beacons, etc. It could also be industrial action or, even fatigued ATCOs.
Controllers are not endorsed until they prove they can manage any situation that could crop up. As you may have guessed, many of these contingencies would reduce the maximum capacity of any given sector where real traffic is concerned.
That’s where regulations enter the picture. Obviously a traffic in emergency (as the name suggest) appears suddenly, and controllers have to improvise. If proper training has been undertaken, improvisation will be kept to a minimum.
But poor weather can usually be forecast, and therefore measures can be taken to reduce sector capacity. These will involve delaying take-off times or modifying flight plan levels or even routes. These are the so called regulations. They can also apply in conjuction with other circumstances (on the job training, illness, equipment failure…)
The local Flow management unit works closely together with Eurocontrol Central Flow Management Unit. Sophisticated computers calculate how each glitch in different airspaces affects any given flight, and calculates, with amazing precision, how much traffic will affect certain sector at a given time.
Where I work, in Madrid, the local flow management unit is situated in a corner of the operations room, and supervisors and the head can easily access the data (workload patterns) that flow management officers have at their disposal. But that is about to be a thing of the past.
Te flow unit is going to be removed from the operations room, to complicate matters for supervisors and controllers, to make it harder to regulate when the weather gets tough, to avoid controllers being aware of their impending workload. Once again, Efficiency before Safety.
Sadly, even considering that Spain has a pretty poor aviation safety record, the authorities can afford loss of lives, but not of money. Even so, they’re mucking it all up, as I will show in my next post.